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Problems 
with 
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Space 
Boosters 
0. W. Clark and R. C. Uddenberg 
THE LAST TWO YEARS have seen the vigorous inauguration by 
the United States of an ambitious program for the explora-
tion of space. This multi-pronged effort, under the direction 
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, is crit-
ically dependent upon the successful development of a new 
generation of large boosters, far greater in size than any missile 
or booster previously developed. 
The concept of the NASA Merritt Island launch facilities 
and the basic principles of the test operations that will be con-
ducted there have been discussed in a number of recent papers 
but the operational problems that will be encountered in the 
use of such facilities have ha.d little discussion and indeed it 
is still too early in the stage design and ground support equip-
ment design of the Saturn V vehicle to define these problems 
in any detail. Using, however, the known dimensions of the 
Saturn V vehicle and the published characteristics of the 
Merritt Island Launch Area as examples, it is possible to 
make a general study of the nature of the operational problems 
that will be encountered during the testing, checkout, and 
launch of such large space vehicles. 
The operational problems will be primarily those due to 
the tremendous size of the vehicle being tested, compared to 
previous boosters and missiles, and to the intention of testing 
these vehicles while in the vertical position. The size of the 
vehicle affects the test operation because of the diameter of 
the vehicle and its length or, as it is in the vertical position, 
its height. 
In earlier boosters, the diameters have ranged from the 
three feet for a Born arc missile to ten feet for an Atlas mis-
sile, with the five foot diameter of the Minuteman being a 
rough average. Compared with these measurements, each 
of the first two stages of the Saturn V has a diameter of 33 
feet; the third stage is 22 feet in diameter. The length of a 
single S-IC stage may be 140 feet and the overall vehicle may 
be 350 feet high. 
The fact that work areas at the pad and the work plat-
forms in the assembly buildings are at heights up to 400 feet 
above the surface will make the potential safety hazards, 
safety design criteria, and safety procedures more significant 
in the large space booster programs. The physiological human 
aspects-such as fear of heights, emotional stability of person-
nel assigned in these areas, design of safety railings, and struc-
ture walls to minimize the feeling of insecurity-must be giver~ 
more emphasis. (The desirability of introducing physiologi-
cal aptitude tests of certain test operations on an experimental 
basis should be evaluated.) 
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Because of the extreme heights, 
the incorporation of means of emer-
gency egress becomes more difficult 
and considerably more expensive. As 
a result, the general trend during 
more recent missile launch facility 
designs to eliminate such systems 
may continue in future programs; if 
so, emergency situations such as fire 
or explosion will impose more dan-
gerous conditions for personnel. 
Therefore, the training of personnel 
in s'.lfety aspects, strict adherence to 
safety procedures, and development 
of adequate precautions becomes 
mandatory to reduce the probability 
of an emergency. 
On the assumption that there will 
normally not be a service tower (or 
work platform around the vehicle at 
any level except the base and possi-
bly the spacecraft), one must con-
sider the possibility that from time 
to time there will be a requirement 
to have personnel working several 
hundred feet above the ground tem-
porarily in a "bosun chair" type of 
suspension from a crane. 
At Cape Canaveral the primary 
solution to many of these problems 
will be simply to avoid the problem 
by sending the vehicle back. The 
Boeing Company's experience with 
Minuteman missiles in silos at AMR 
is that in most cases replacement of 
components is done by removing 
the Minuteman from the silo and re-
turning the entire missile to the As-
sembly Building to make the replace-
ment. In this case, the replacement 
philosophy has been dictated by the 
missile design, which in turn was 
dictated by the Air Force design phi-
losophy for replacement at tactical 
sites. 
In the case of Saturn and other 
large space vehicles, there is no need 
to compromise AMR tests by con-
siderations of tactical deployment 
criteria. Nevertheless, in many cases 
where access is not convenient at the 
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pad, it may be desirable to return the 
vehicle to the Assembly Building for 
replacement, repair, or modification. 
For Saturn, in particular, there is a 
very definite obje~tive to reduce the 
amount of time spent by the vehicle 
a t the pad and reduce the amount of 
maintenance work done there. 
Access to Equipment Inside 
In previous missile designs, the 
circumference of the vehicle was suf-
ficiently small that interior access 
could be adequately provided through 
strategically located portholes or ac-
cess doors through which a hand and 
arm could be inserted. The size and 
location of the port was generally de-
termined by the size of a man's hand 
and the average length of his arm. 
Occasionally, the ports were larger to 
allow removal and installation of 
small hand held components. 
In the case of Saturn C-5 stages, 
with a 33 feet diameter and access re-
stricted during launch pad occupancy 
to a walkway or crawlway through an 
umbilical arm, the situation is very 
different. (See Figure 1) Since ac-
cess is limited to one vertical plane 
tangent to the umbilical tower and 
at four to six horizontal levels speci-
fied by umbilical locations, very few 
access doors can be used. 
In places where they are located, 
the doors will be enlarged so that a 
man can crawl into the interior of the 
vehicle. Interior walks or work plat-
forms will be required to reach equip-
ment that is installed anywhere from 
several feet up to 30 feet from the 
doorway. Since weight is always a 
consideration, and is likely to be ap-
preciable here because of the required 
catwalk span, permanent flyaway 
prov1s10ns are impractical. Some 
capability of disassembly and re-
moval of the platforms through the 
access door must then be provided. 
This brief analysis leads to a series 
of access problems which combine de-
sign and operational considerations. 
If the internal platforms are of the 
non-fly-away type (that is, they 
must be removed before launch) they 
probably will be removed at some late 
point in the countdown, probably 
within the last two hours. This means 
that the installation and removal pro-
visions must be performed in only a 
few minutes to conserve valuable 
countdown time or to achieve a re-
strictive launch window. 
No matter how late in the count-
dovvn these platforms are removed, it 
is conceivable that they may again 
need to be replaced in the vehicle. 
Some malfunction, minor in terms of 
time required to correct by compon-
ent replacement, but mandatory for 
the flight, will require the replace-
ment of the platform after removal 
and after propellant servicing. A 
platform to be replaced in the ve-
hicle by a single man kneeling on 
the umbilical arm and working 
through a small access door will re-
quire that the platform, or at least the 
first section of the platform to go in 
and the last section to come out, must 
be light in weight, not overly cumber-
some, and easy to align and secure 
on whatever support structure is pro-
vided. The platform must also be 
designed to minimize the possibili-
ties of being dropped during instal-
lation or removal and to minimize 
any possible damage that might be 
caused if it were dropped. 
Because of the awkward space ar-
rangements on the interior of the 
vehicle, any component weighing over 
60 pounds will probably require two 
men for its handling, which means 
that the platform must support two 
men and the component. 
During all of these situations there 
must be no deterioration of vehicle 
reliability; that is, there should be no 
appreciable danger of damage by 
dropping or by bumping of the tanks 
or shells by components or platforms. 
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In addition, if there is any possibility 
that a man might step on a tank 
head, the head must be capable of 
withstanding the load, or there must 
be temporary mattress pads, or the 
test engineer must wear special shoe 
packs. Similarly, with respect to 
dropping of tools, there must be in-
dividual attachments to each tool, or 
pads or close mesh nets temporarily 
suspended below the work area, or 
screens on the side of the platforms. 
Vehicle reliability must be maintain-
ed despite adverse working condi-
tions. 
Environmental Control 
Because of the large size of the 
vehicles, environmental control of 
complete components in areas ad-
jacent to cryogenic tanks (such as 
LOX and LH2) will probably be im-
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practical. This leads to several prob-
lems. 
Temperature sensitive electronic 
equipment, such as telemeter, signal 
condftioners, tracking, and ordnance 
rf systems, that is installed in these 
areas will probably be installed in en-
vironmentally controlled cannisters. 
The maintenance philosophy could 
either be removal and replacement of 
the entire cannister or removal and 
replacement of a component within 
it. Either a pp roach could create 
special problems, such as lifting and 
moving the entire cannister, or open-
ing the cannister and making criti-
cal emplacements, connections, or 
adjustments inside the cannister. un-
der adverse visibility and access con-
ditions. 
When tanks are serviced there 
could be safety hazards because of 
inflammable or explosive vapors. 
This will require special considera-
tion of personnel-to-vehicle ground-
ing and non-sparking equipment and 
clothing, particularly during remova 1 
of work platforms. 
It is apparent that the times dur-
ing launch operations in which ac-
cess is required is significant. If ac-
cess is required after the tanks are 
filled, the temperature in these areas 
may range as low as -100°F. Thus, 
protective clothing would be required. 
Undesirable as it might be to enter 
the vehicle after it is loaded, there 
is always the possibility that making 
minor repairs or replacements under 
difficult conditions is more desirable, 
and will cause less launch delays, 
than draining propellants and return-
ing the vehicle to the Assembly 
Building. This does involve, how-
ever, certain additional design consid-
erations. If the test engineers are to 
wear protective clothing during cer-
tain periods of time in these areas, 
then all fasteners, methods of attach-
ment, and trouble shooting test points 
must be functionally capable of oper-
ation by personnel attired in cloth-
ing that is bulky or restrictive in 
movement. 
Access to Equipment Outside 
A prime problem concerning acces~ 
to equipment outside the vehicle is 
the use of antenna hoods for complete 
testing of the RF link through an-
tenna systems. If large vehicle launch 
facilities have no routine service 
structure at the pad, and external ac-
cess is restricted to the plane adjacent 
to the umbilical towers, there would 
be appreciable effect on the concept 
of the utilization of such hoods. For if 
the hoods cannot be removed easily 
when the tests on the pad are com-
pleted, there must be other provisions 
for limiting radiation. These might 
be coaxial switches in temporary 
hardline cable connections ahead of 
the radiating elements. Such pro-
visions would necessarily have to re-
main in the system until relatively 
late in the launch preparation phase. 
The changing of such connections 
then inherently provides a potential 
effect on the overall system reliability 
and must be evaluated accordingly. 
In any case, the problem is another 
typical example of the relationship 
between operational problems with 
these large space boosters and the 
stage design itself. 
Size of Components 
The large size of the advanced 
vehicles will create new problems 
with respect to the size of compon-
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ents normally subject to field replace-
ment. For example, valve assem-
blies in 20 inch LOX lines and 12 
inch RP-1 fuel lines and TCV acti-
vators are approaching the size of a 
small man. The removal and re-
placement of these components will 
demand design emphasis on access 
requirements to interior areas to the 
same or to a greater extent than is re-
qired in small vehicles such as Min-
uteman. 
In many cases, at various levels of 
the vehicle the size of the components 
will require special slings or me-
chanical devices for handling the com-
ponents. Access provisions for the 
handling equipment in close proxi-
mity to the vehicle or under the ve-
hicle in the first stage engine area will 
create special design considerations. 
Moving flight batteries weighing 80 
to 100 pounds through an umbilical 
arm and through a crawl-in access 
door inside the vehicle is a task that 
will tax the capabilities of two men 
under restricted physical movement 
conditions unless special handling 
provisions are incorporated. This is 
an operation that under some condi-
tions might be performed within one 
day of scheduled launch and it is 
very probable that the batteries will 
have to be replaced at the pad sev-
eral times during the course of the 
test. 
It should be noted that ground 
equipment, such as slings and hoist-
ing provisions, does not constitute the 
total problem; there must be includ-
ed in the design of the stage compon-
ents themselves adequate, readily ac-
cessable field handling provisions 
such as lugs, brackets, or support 
points. One of the principal factors 
here is a common overemphasis by 
design engineers that either the part 
will never need replacing, or that if 
it does need replacing, this is best 
done at the factory. 
There is no question that the fac-
tory replacement of large and heavy 
components is desirable. But, the 
tremendous size and weight of the 
assembled vehicles of the type under 
discussion leads to problems in trans-
portation and timing that preclude 
such procedures, and obviously pre-
clude the provisioning of spare, or 
alternate, vehicles. 
For these reasons, there must be 
continuing emphasis on provisioning 
for field handling and field replace-
ment of even large components. 
Vehicle Interior Lighting 
Operations personnel will be work-
ing inside a large diameter vehicle un-
der quite variable conditions from the 
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factory to the launch pad. The re-
quirements for interior lighting in 
support of these activities must be 
evaluated at an early stage and pro-
visions incorporated during the de-
sign of the ground or flight hardware. 
General factors to be considered are 
the duration of the work period, the 
functions to be performed, and the 
processing phase during which the 
function is performed (such as fac-
tory versus launch pad) . The main-
tenance philosophy will have a heavy 
influence on the requirements. 
The means of providing interior 
lighting may take several forms, de-
pending upon the evaluation of re-
quirements and the determination of 
most practical methods. In general, 
each method may affect the configu-
ration of the ground equipment or 
flight hardware. 
A battery powered portable head 
mounted light or a temporary ex-
tension cord arrangement plugged in-
to a receptacle mounted on the umbil-
ical arm or work platform adjacent to 
the vehicle could be used. The ex-
tension cord would allow the light to 
be suspended by a temporary attach-
ment in the work area, such as a hook 
arrangement, magnetic clamps (de-
pending on structure materials) , suc-
tion cups, or slide-in/ out brackets 
mounted permanently in strategic lo-
cations. 
Permanently installed fly-away 
wiring and lights in the vehicle could 
also be used. These lights would ob-
tain power through the umbilicals or 
via short connector cables through 
an access door to a receptacle on the 
umbilical arm or work platform. 
Communications 
As launch vehicles grow larger, the 
requirements for communications be-
tween test personnel become more 
acute. The requirement for a Bomarc 
type vehicle, for example, was for a 
crew of about 5 people at one time, 
working on a vehicle only 40 feet 
long. The requirement for a Saturn 
type vehicle will be for about 60 
people operating on a vehicle 400 
feet high. 
The problem becomes still more 
acute when facilities are separated 
so that the entire control of the test 
operation is from a different area 
than the one in which the operations 
are performed. 
As shown in Figure 2, the distance 
between the flight hardware and the 
individual system test sets may vary 
from 50 feet to several hundred feet. 
The normal mode of operation during 
vehicle test operations will require 
several subgroups of stage people 
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working concurrently in parallel with 
similar groups of three to four other 
major stages, each checking out their 
individual systems. Most of these 
people will be out of sight and hear-
ing with respect to each other (even 
when working on a single subsys-
tem). They will be working under 
remote test conduct control (auto-
matic or manual modes) from a 
building as much as three miles away 
and getting real time data process-
ing and feedback to displays at test 
sets near the vehicle or to the test 
control room. The widely spread and 
multipath nature of the system makes 
a tightly controlled and widely dis-
tributed communications net manda-
tory. In general, these requirements 
can probably be best fulfilled by a 
hardwire system with strategically 
located outlets for plugging in and 
longer coilwire stretch connections to 
headsets. These would be similar to 
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Conduct of Test Operations. 
systems presently in use, such as 
MOPS, MITOC, and Norcom. The 
locations of outlets, however, will be 
somewhat unusual with respect to 
previous programs. Since personnel 
will be working inside the vehicle at 
distances up to 30 feet from an access 
door, it may be desirable and practi-
cal to extend the communications net 
into the vehicle itself through per-
manently installed fly-away wiring 
and strategically located outlets in 
work areas of heavy usage and long 
duration. The connection between 
the vehicle and the work platforms or 
launcher umbilical arms could be 
one that is broken when convenient 
at the time of final prelaunch prepa-
ration of the vehicle. 
This mode of operation is basically 
an extension of the large aircraft 
ground communications principle 
where ground crews are plugged into 
the aircraft radio system intercom 
• NOTE: Test Engineer Locations (typical) 
for communications with the person-
nel on board the aircraft during 
ground tests and preflight readiness 
checks. 
Conclusions 
A great deal of thought is required 
in the design stage for the require-
ments of checkout of large space ve-
hicles. Adequate consideration must 
be given to the operational and serv-
icing problems that will be encounter-
ed during preflight checkout. If 
these problems have been difficult 
in the past, they are going to be more 
so with the large space boosters of 
the future. It is necessary, then, to 
begin an analysis before the design 
is complete and the operations are be-
ing conducted. This approach will 
allow adequate time to alleviate many 
of the operational problems that are 
certain to be encountered. 
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